Here is another instance in which you are proven to be a liar. This from the U.S.7th Circuit Ct of Appeals which is the same circut ct that rendered the famous Spears v. Brennan decision.

The district court denied the petition for attorney's fees. It took the view that the determination of an appropriate award of attorney's fees under the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. sec. 1692k(a)(3)) is governed by the same standard that has been used for determining attorney's fees awards pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988. It then noted that, in the context of making that determination under sec. 1988, the Supreme Court has said that the nature of relief awarded to a prevailing party bears on the propriety of awarding fees. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992). Thus, reasoned the district court, in some circumstances, even a party who formally prevails should receive no attorney's fees at all. Accordingly, continued the district court, a victorious plaintiff may receive no attorney's fees if the plaintiff's recovery is merely technical or de minimis. The court then noted that, in applying Farrar, we have adopted a three-factor test to determine if relief is merely technical or de minimis: (1) the difference between the judgment recovered and the judgment sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed; and (3) the public purpose served by the litigation. See Johnson v. Lafayette Fire Fighters Ass'n, 51 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1995). After a consideration of these factors, the district court concluded that the only reasonable fee was no fee.

All of your stupid brayings relate to situations that are merely technical or de minimis and therefore telling people that it award of attorneys fees is mandatory is dangerously false and misleading.

Normie, you are losing ground fast. Best you shut up, quit giving legal advice and take down your silly blog which only serves to convict you.


E. Normis wrote:

If you're in need of any further applicable case law, just axe me.

I'll be only too happy to axe you and here it is.

In Happy the United States Supreme Court ruled that in order for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim for attorneys fees the plaintiff must have received a judgment against the defendant which changed the behaviour of the defendant towards the plaintiff in some meaningful way.

Here is the decision of the United States Supreme Court.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide today whether a plaintiff who receives a nominal damages award is a "prevailing party" eligible to receive attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed an award of attorney's fees on the ground that a plaintiff receiving only nominal damages is not a prevailing party. Although we hold that such a plaintiff is a prevailing party, we affirm the denial of fees in this case.

Now then, who are we to believe, The United States Supreme Court or a braying jackass?

The question hinges on whether a highly questionable suit such as you have dreamed about materially changes the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant in some meaningful way.

In your well brayed argument, the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant would not be materially affected because the plaintiff still owes the debt regardless of who is doing the collecting.

So the relationship is not materially affected and any such award as you might dream about getting would still be a de minimus amount and would not materially affect the right of the creditor to collect the debt. All it might accomplish is to affect his choice of debt collectors and the creditor would not have relinquished his right to collect simply because he chose the wrong collector to do his collecting for him.

So the reality is that you are nothing but a deadbeat trying to scheme some ludicrous way out of paying your debts and are attempting to teach other deadbeats how to do the same. Problem is that your braying is absolutely de minimums and even if you are right about being able to sue the debt collector it makes no diffenrence whatever and does not change the legal status of the debt. The debtor still owes the debt and your enormis deadbeat brayings are not going to change that fact in the slightest.

So once again, who are we to believe, the United States Supreme Court or an enormis braying deadbeat jackass?

Uncle Normie's new website.
http://www.geocities.com/enormis_debter

creditwrench-thetruth

Creditwrench, the FDCPA, and the law Part II

You are indeed a new breed of dunce so great that they would have to invent dunce caps with twin towers.

First of all, what I have said quite plainly here and elsewhere is that in the event that if an unlicensed debt collector attempts to collect a debt in a state where such license is demanded it is the state that is injured and not the citizen. In making that statement it is or should be quite plain that he has no right to bring a case against the debt collector under state law for those violations because it is the state and not the citizen who is the injured party.

Does he have a right to bring suit under other law such as federal statutes? Maybe. Quite possibly even. Could Hawks have been charged with a Rico offense? Maybe, but Picht didn't raise that issue. Could the
judgment and subsequent garnishment have been successfully challenged under Minnesota law. Yes, it could have since the garnishment was also patently illegal under Minnesota law according to the Eighth Circuit.

There were 3 distinct underlying and pivotal reasons why the Eighth acted as it did, but the those 3 questions were not raised by Picht but rather the question brought to the Eighth was whether or not Hawks had violated FDCPA and the court came back with the right answer albeit the right answer to the wrong question. As I have also said many times over, if you ask a judge the wrong question and you will get the right answer to the wrong question every time.

And it is the same with you. In your case however, you are so stupid that you bring the wrong answer to the right question and the right question in this instance is whether or not a citizen has the right to bring private action under state law if a certain state statute, law rule or regulation has been violated and in the case of violation of a state licensure law the private citizen has no right to bring private action for that violation.

A parallel example might be that if you are injured by an unlicensed motorist do you have the right to bring action against him for his failure to obtain a drivers license? No. Of course not. Can you sue him under some other law? Of course you can.

So a debt collector is unlicensed in your state, can you sue him for his failure to obtain a license? No, because you are not the injured party, the state is the injured party. Can you sue him under some other law? Yes, but once again we come up against the proverbial practical fence which is how many debtors are there out there willing to stand in the shoes of Picht and go all the way to the eighth? Few indeed and most especially since a much simpler remedy was easily at hand long before it reached the point that it did.

The full truth behind Picht simply cannot be told here for lack of room and it also cannot be fully discussed on any blog either because it is far too lengthy for even a blog.

As usual, your foolish braying misses the point entirely and is misleading and will cost those who believe you an awful lot of time, expense and grief before they get any relief or repayment.

All you are doing is hurting people with your foolish braying and most people understand that real quick and want no part of what you are braying about.

They got far better things to do than go jumping through all the hoops it would take to get them anywhere near the Eighth Circuit level. Most in fact would far rather just pay the $900 than go through all of that just to get the $1,000 statutory reward.

Your supposed cures are worse than the illness they suffer from.

Picht could have easily been cured long before the appellate stage yet you have to bray about it to prove your useless point and lead people astray with misleading information.

You are like a yapping dog that runs along the fence barking at every car that passes by.

And here is the proof that your ideas are dangerously false, misleading and fraudulent. Read it and weep sucker.

Posted: February 04 2005 at 12:02pm | IP Logged Quote Creditwrench
No, I still don't like "Uncle Normie's" attempts to use wrong case law to prove his silly contentions. In fact, unlicensed debt collection and FDCPA was not the crux of the case and was not what the court rendered it's decision about. Let us move on to other cases which point that out quite vividly.

In Goins v. JBC & Associates, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut specifically rejected that argument as have many other courts. Here is the relevant part of the Goins case proving that your advice to others claiming that I am wrong and that suit under FDCPA is authorized and is practical. Once again, you are proven a liar, a fraud and a poster of dangerously false and misleading information. Read it and weep sucker.

2. License
JBC was not licensed in Connecticut as a consumer collection
agency at the time defendants sent the February 17, 2003 debt
collection notice to plaintiff, and their application for a
license has since been denied. See Letter from John P. Burke,
Banking Commissioner, State of Connecticut, to Jack Boyajian,
Mar. 18, 2004, [Doc. # 60] (denying application for consumer
collection agency license that JBC had filed on November 5,
2002).
Although the February 17, 2003 letter does not claim
application, and have not sought leave to respond to the
evidence. See Bayway Refining Co. v. Oxygenated Marketing and
Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2000).
A license is required under Connecticut law if the
collection agency "(2) has its place of business located outside
this state and collects from consumer debtors who reside within
this state for creditors who are located within this state; or
(3) has its place of business located outside this state and
regularly collects from consumer debtors who reside within this
state for creditors who are located outside this state." Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 36a-801(a). Here, there is no dispute that Goins is
a Connecticut resident, and that JBC is a firm located outside of
the state. While defendants argue in their opposition to
plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment that plaintiff
that JBC is licensed in Connecticut, plaintiff argues that
defendants’ unlicensed attempt to collect a debt from plaintiff,
violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (barring any "action that cannot
legally be taken"); § 1692e(9) (prohibiting misrepresentation of
document’s state authorization or approval); and § 1692f
(prohibiting the use of "unfair or unconscionable means to
collect or attempt to collect any debt."). See also Clomon v.
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he use of any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation in a collection
letter violates § 1692e regardless of whether the representation
in question violates a particular subsection of that provision.")
Connecticut requires consumer collection agencies acting
within the state to be licensed. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-
801(a) ("No person shall act within this state as a consumer
collection agency without a consumer collection agency
license."), and prohibits a collection agency from, among other
has not provided any evidentiary support showing where JBC’s
client-creditors are located, and that it remains disputed
whether JBC "regularly collects" from Connecticut consumers, the
Court finds that plaintiff’s unchallenged evidence establishes
JBC’s need for a Connecticut license. Defendants have
acknowledged in their responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories
that they used form letters aimed at Connecticut debtors from
2001 to the present. See [Doc. # 38]; see also Deposition
Transcript of Jack Boyajian, Jan. 27, 2004 [Doc. # 60] at 71
(explaining bar codes on form letters that reflect "that the
transaction was in Connecticut"). Further, the State of
Connecticut Department of Banking’s March 18, 2004 letter denying
JBC a license notes that "it appears that [JBC] has been acting
as a consumer collection agency in Connecticut without a license
in violation of Section 36a-801(a) of the Connecticut General
States. Indeed, between December 2002 and February 2004, 9
Connecticut residents filed with the Division complaints against
[JBC] alleging harassment in connection with the collection of
debts and, in some cases, disputing the debts." Letter from John
P. Burke, Banking Commissioner to Jack Boyajian, Mar. 18, 2004

things, "institut[ing] judicial proceedings on behalf of others."
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-805(a)(1). Considering these provisions
in Gaetano v. Payco of Wisconsin, Inc., 774 F.Supp. 1404 (D.
Conn. 1990), the district court held that a debt collection
agency that was unlicensed by the state of Connecticut, which
demanded payment of the debt and stated that it would use all
means to enforce collection, "violated § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA by
threatening to take action that legally could not be taken." Id.
at 1415. Gaetano has been followed by several other district
courts. See, e.g. Sibley v. Firstcollect, Inc., 913 F.Supp. 469,
471 (M.D. La.1995) (finding violation of § 1692e(5) when
unlicensed debt collector attempted to collect a debt from
consumer); Russey v. Rankin, 911 F.Supp. 1449, 1459 (D. N.M.
1995); Kuhn v. Account Control Technology, Inc., 865 F.Supp.
1443, 1451-52 (D. Nev. 1994).
Not all courts have adopted a categorical rule that an FDCPA
violation occurs whenever an unlicensed debt collector sends out
any debt collection notice, and instead some have looked to the
content of the notice. Most notably, in Wade v. Regional Credit
Association, 87 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit
found that the defendant’s unlicensed debt collection activity
was not a "threat to take action that could not legally be taken"
in violation of FDCPA § 1692e(5)


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